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ABSTRACT 
The growth of online alternative lending presents several 
advantages for both those seeking credit and those with excess 
capital to lend. Over the past decade, several different models of 
peer-to-peer lending have emerged in the US and U.K. Each of 
these models has developed in response to the different regulatory 
system it faces, which has led to the models’ different risk and 
reward profiles. However, the current regulatory framework for 
regulating peer-to-peer lending, especially in the U.S., leaves 
much to be desired. The inadequate regulatory regime not only 
hampers the potential for growth and further innovation in the 
industry, but also creates risks for consumers, lenders, and, as the 
sector grows, entire markets. There is no clear or easy answer as 
to the optimal regulatory regime, but regulators should at least 
consider the basic functions of peer-to-peer lending and how to 
address risks with a more comprehensive and sensible model for 
regulation.  
INTRODUCTION 
 Peer-to-peer lending has existed in many formats and many 
cultures1 for some time. Today, potential borrowers can go on websites 
like Prosper.com or LendingClub.com and input their financial 
information. Then, these sites filter that information through a proprietary 
formula for assessing creditworthiness before anonymously advertising 
the information to potential lenders who wish to fund that consumer’s 
loan.2 The rise of the internet has created huge potential for the 
                                                     
† Duke University School of Law, Juris Doctor 2016. Special thanks to Professor 
Steven L. Schwarcz for his guidance and advice. This paper owes a debt to his 
work on Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach (August 8, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469467. 
1 See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer 
Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory 
Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 497 (2012) 
(discussing the existence of informal peer-to-peer lending networks within 
Chinese, Mexican, and Korean communities in the U.S. and abroad).  
2 See How It Works, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com (last visited Apr. 14, 
2015); How Does an Online Credit Marketplace Work, LENDING CLUB, 
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disintermediation of financial services.3 Just as Web 1.0 websites such as 
eBay.com allowed the buyers and sellers of goods to connect directly and 
efficiently over large distances,4 other technology companies like Paypal 
made forays into business-lines that were previously the exclusive 
province of banks and other financial services sector players.5 Thus, it 
wasn’t long before companies’ websites like Prosper.com and 
LendingClub.com in the US, Zopa.com in the UK, and other Web 2.0 
platforms began experimenting with models of lending that would by-pass 
the traditional bank lending experience. These models would directly 
connect individuals and small businesses seeking funds with other 
individuals and businesses (now typically hedge funds) with excess capital 
to lend.6 
 Since the early 2000s the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending industry has 
grown into a multi-billion dollar, global industry.7 P2P lenders have grown 
both in number and complexity along with the industry. The 
Prosper/Lending Club model discussed below is no longer the only model 
of P2P lending.8 Instead, innovators in this space have developed a variety 
of models for sourcing capital to fund these loans, while other innovators 
                                                     
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2015). 
3 Disintermediation refers to the process of removing the process of or going 
around the traditional intermediaries in a transaction. In the lending context, 
banks, credit unions, pay-day lenders served as intermediaries connecting those 
with capital (often in the form of bank deposits) with borrowers seeking funds.  
4 See generally Who We Are, EBAY,  http://www.ebayinc.com/who_we_are/one 
_company (last visited May 26, 2016). 
5 See id. Paypal Holdings, Inc. is now a subsidiary of eBay, Inc.  
6 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING: NEW 
REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS (2011) 
[hereinafter GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING], http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11613.pdf; Tracy Alloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending Comes of Age as 
Wall Street Muscles In, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 
0/d6903c54-4447-11e4-8abd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz49knqQTh6 (last visited 
May 26, 2016) (discussing the growing role of traditional financial sector players 
like institutional investors in funding P2P Lending); PEER2PEER FIN. ASSOC., 
PEER-TO-PEER FINANCE: MARKET DATA 2 (2014) [hereinafter P2PFA, MARKET 
DATA (2014)], http://p2pfa.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Peer-to-Peer-
Lending-DataSheet-Q3-v3.pdf. 
7 See P2PFA, MARKET DATA (2014), supra note 6, at 2. 
8 See, e.g., Mike Butcher, Landbay Brings The P2P Finance Model To Buy-To-
Let In The UK, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/ 
11/landbay-brings-the-p2p-finance-model-to-buy-to-let-in-the-uk/. 
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have identified niche spaces and markets in which to concentrate their 
lending activity.9  
 Currently, the SEC is responsible for regulating P2P lenders in the 
U.S.10 This means that P2P lenders are in the position of either registering 
the loans (i.e. notes that correspond to the loans)11 or finding an exemption 
to Section 5 of the ’33 Act.12 The consumer-side (i.e. borrower-side) of the 
transaction is still governed by state usury laws and, now, potentially the 
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).13 The U.K., the 
country where most of the world’s other major P2P lenders reside, 
regulates P2P lending through its Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).14 
The FCA is in some ways like a hybrid of the CFPB and SEC, as its 
mandate includes consumer credit protection, broker-dealer oversight, 
insider-trading and market-abuse prosecutions.15 P2P Lending in the U.K. 
is additionally overseen by the Peer2Peer Finance Association, a self-
regulatory organization, which promulgates standards and best practices 
for member-firms operating in the sector.16 Right now, these two 
regulatory models serve as the only existing examples of ways to approach 
P2P lending.  
                                                     
9 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, After Year of Growth, Prosper Buys a Surgical 
Procedures Lender, DEAL BOOK (Jan. 27, 2015), http://dealbook. 
nytimes.com/2015/01/27/after-year-of-growth-prosper-buys-a-surgical-
procedures-lender/ (discussing a P2P lender bought by Prosper that focuses 
exclusively on providing P2P loans for elective surgical procedures).  
10 Paul Slattery, Square Pegs in A Round Hole: Sec Regulation of Online Peer-to-
Peer Lending and the CFPB Alternative, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 254–258 
(2013). 
11 Prosper and Lending Club, the two largest P2P lenders in the U.S. have decided 
to register their securities with the SEC. See id.  
12 Other P2P Lenders in the U.S. have presumably used § 3(a)(11), see Press 
Release, Jackellyn Trinh, GROUNDFLOOR, Groundfloor Launches Landmark 
Securities Offering to Enable Crowdfunding of Real Estate Transactions (Apr. 
29, 2014) (explaining that it previously restricted investors to Georgia residents), 
or have sold exclusively to accredited investors presumably under a Regulation D 
offering, see PATCH OF LAND, https://patchofland.com (last visited March 3, 
2015).   
13 GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 5.  
14 Financial Conduct Authority, Un-official Outline of FCA Regulatory 
Requirements for Peer-to-Peer Lending Platforms (2014), p2pfa.info/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/FCA-P2P-regulation-vf.docx. 
15 The FCA was created by the Financial Services Act (2012) (U.K), which 
enumerated the powers of the FCA and its counter-part the Prudential Regulation 
Authority, which primarily regulates the banking sector. See Financial Services 
Act, 2012, cl. 21 (UK). 
16 Rules and Membership Criteria of P2PFA, PEER2PEER FIN. ASSOC., 
http://p2pfa.info/rules (last visited May 26, 2016). 
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 While the U.K. system lends itself to a more systematic and 
comprehensive approach to P2P lending, both the U.S. and U.K. 
regulatory systems seem backward-looking—focusing on the consumer 
credit abuses of the past—rather than identifying the ways P2P lenders 
function within the financial system in the present. The purpose of this 
note is to survey the different models of P2P lending and take a functional 
approach in identifying the strengths and weaknesses that result from those 
models. Part I will explore the history and regulation of P2P lending 
focusing mostly on the U.S., using the U.K. as a point of comparison. Part 
II will examine examples of different models of P2P lending and the 
regulatory requirements each model faces. Part III will look at the financial 
functions of P2P lending on both a microprudential and macroprudential 
level, noting the effect of different models of P2P lending on these 
functions. By doing this, the hope is that regulators, innovators, and 
students of P2P lending can design comprehensive and systematic 
regulatory solutions that take full advantage of P2P lending’s innovative 
approach to solving problems in the financial sector.17 
I. REGULATING THE PEER-TO-PEER LENDER: THE HISTORY AND 
CURRENT STATE OF THINGS 
 The regulation of P2P lenders in the US involves oversight by 
various state and federal regulators.18 Much of the current debate over the 
regulation of P2P lending in the U.S. has focused on an early draft of 
Dodd-Frank proposed by the House of Representatives that would have 
moved responsibility for regulating the industry from the SEC to the newly 
formed CFPB. While the final version of Dodd Frank did not contain such 
a provision, it did require the GAO to study the issue and publish a report.19 
Congress has taken no further action on designating an agency to oversee 
P2P lending.20 Thus, the discussion below will focus primarily on the role 
of the SEC and the debate over whether the CFPB is a better candidate for 
supervising the industry.  
 The U.K.’s regulation of P2P lenders benefited from a complete 
overhaul of the U.K.’s regulatory approach to financial services regulation 
in 2012.21 Thus, it is worth considering the U.K.’s single agency approach 
                                                     
17 This “functional approach” is borrowed from Steven Schwarcz, Regulating 
Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100(4) MINN. L.R. 1441 (2015) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change]. 
18 GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 2.  
19 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
20 See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 450 (2011). 
21 See generally Philip Rawlings, All Change: The Fall of the FSA and the Further 
Rise of the Bank of England, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 16 
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to regulating P2P lending as a point of comparison in considering the 
merits of such a system.   
A. Regulation by the SEC 
 The federal regulation of P2P lending in the U.S. started in earnest 
with the SEC’s action against Prosper Marketplace (“Prosper”) in 2008.22 
Prior to the SEC’s action it was unclear whether P2P lenders were issuing 
securities within the bounds of federal securities laws when connecting 
lenders and borrowers.23 The SEC’s action forced Prosper to register the 
notes it issued to those providing the capital to fund its consumer loans,24 
which also resulted in Lending Club suspending operations for several 
months in order to voluntarily register its notes.25 
 The SEC imposed registration requirements on Prosper and 
Lending Club largely due to the way the two companies structure their 
transactions.26 The companies use their online platforms to identify 
borrowers and then apply proprietary risk-appraisal methods to determine 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and the appropriate interest rates.27 The 
platforms also let lenders make loans anonymously to the borrowers based 
on these proprietary formulas.28 At this point, however, the lender does not 
directly lend their money through the platform to that buyer.29 Instead, 
borrowers using Lending Club or Prosper receive loans from WebBank, 
an FDIC-insured bank based in Utah.30 The online platforms then purchase 
the loan and issue a corresponding note for that loan to the lender.31 The 
P2P platform is responsible for servicing the loan and passing on proceeds 
to the lender.32 The P2P platform makes money in these transactions by 
                                                     
(2011) (discussing the restructuring financial services regulation in the U.K. after 
the 2008 financial crisis).  
22 Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984. 
23 Paul Slattery, supra note 10, at 252.  
24 See id.; Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984.  
25  Carl E. Smith, If It's Not Broken, Don't Fix It: The SEC's Regulation of Peer-
to-Peer Lending, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 21, 22–23 (2010).   
26 Id. at 21–22; see also Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984. 
27 Id.; GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 11–12. Prosper 
originally allowed lenders to bid on an interest rate, but switched to designating 
an interest rate based on a proprietary formula in 2010. See also Chaffee & Rapp, 
supra note 1, at 494. 
28 See Slattery, supra note 10, at 236.  
29 See GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 10–14.  
30 See id.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 13.  
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charging an origination fee for the loan and then a servicing fee on the 
payments.33 
 In the Prosper enforcement action, the SEC determined that these 
notes qualified as securities under SEC v. W.J.Howey Co. and Reves v. 
Ernst & Young.34 The Howey investment contract was easy for the SEC to 
meet.35 Prosper (and Lending Club) serves as a promoter for a common 
investment scheme and investors rely on the expertise of the P2P platforms 
to find opportunities and operate.36 The SEC also successfully argued that 
the note issued by the P2P platforms did not fall into any of the exemptions 
found in Reves.37 This meant that each note sold to investors would need 
to meet Section 5 of the 1933 Act’s requirements.38 Thus, the result of the 
SEC’s actions was a chilling effect on other P2P platforms following the 
Prosper and Lending Club model.39 
 Other P2P lenders in the U.S. have avoided the registration of their 
securities by limiting participation on the lender-side to accredited or 
institutional investors.40 At least one other P2P lending platform tested its 
model using a § 3(a)(11) intrastate offering, but, in a relatively short time 
decided to submit to the expense and heightened regulatory scrutiny that 
accompanies registration.41 These approaches allow new entrants into the 
P2P lending space to experiment with different models and in different 
markets, but in other ways diminishes some of the overall goals of P2P 
Lending—namely the disintermediation of financing and connecting 
borrowers and willing lenders.  
                                                     
33 Verstein, supra note 20, at 454. 
34 See generally Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984. For a 
thorough summary and analysis of the SEC’s action, see Chaffee & Rapp, supra 
note 1, at 509–19.  
35 Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 509–19.  
36 Id. at 509–14. 
37 Id. at 514.  
38 See Verstein, supra note 20, at 476.  
39 See id. at 490. See, e.g., Giles Andrews, The Tricky World of US Regulation, 
ZOPA BLOG (Nov. 28, 2008), http://blog.zopa.com/archives/2008/11/28/the-
tricky-world-of-us-regulation. 
40 Se,e e.g., PATCH OF LAND, https://patchofland.com (last visited May 26, 2016). 
Patch of Land takes advantage of the 506(c) exemption created by the JOBS Act, 
which allows for the advertisement of Regulation D offerings so long as the issuer 
using the exemption only sells to accredited investors and has some means of 
confirming all of the purchasers qualify, in fact, as accredited investors. See id. 
See also Exemption for limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount 
of offering, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c). 
41 See, e.g., Trinh, supra note 12. 
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B. Dodd Frank and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 During the 2008 Financial Crisis, traditional lines of credit 
became nearly impossible for ordinary individuals and small businesses to 
access.42 Nonetheless, P2P lending continued to grow during the crisis.43 
The original House version of the Dodd Frank Act exempted P2P lending 
from SEC oversight.44 Instead, the House bill designated the newly created 
CFPB as the appropriate regulator for the P2P lending industry.45 Scholars 
have argued that the new agency, with its focus on protecting consumers, 
could best consolidate the regulation of P2P lending and help the nascent 
industry avoid the current regulatory environment that subjects platforms 
to “at least ten federal statutes and as many agencies.”46 Thus, arguments 
in favor of the CFBP taking up regulatory responsibility for P2P lending 
focuses on two points—first, the benefits of a single regulator, and, 
second, the consumer credit focus of the new agency.47  
 The benefits of a single regulator in the CFPB are obvious. Rather 
than subjecting existing P2P lenders and new entrants to regulation by 
various state and federal agencies, P2P lenders could benefit from the 
certainty that comes with interfacing with a single regulator. Proponents 
of the CFPB as a single regulator model also note that having a single 
regulator with a broad mandate overseeing P2P lending means that the 
regulator can be much more responsive to innovations and new models of 
P2P lending.48 
 The broad mandate of the CFPB also supports arguments for a 
single CFPB regulator. The CFPB’s mandate contains a “catchall 
jurisdiction to regulate any entity that the CFPB has ‘reasonable cause to 
determine’ poses a risk to consumers in financial transactions.”49 This 
broad mandate gives the CFPB far more flexibility to tailor regulation to 
the unique benefits and threats posed by individual P2P lenders and the 
industry at large.50 The SEC, on the other hand, traditionally operated on 
a narrower mandate that focuses on protecting investors through 
                                                     
42 Slattery, supra note 10, at 235.  
43 See id.  
44 Id. at 253–54.  
45 See id.  
46 Id. at 237.  
47 See, e.g., id.; see also GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 36–
37 (discussing the role and powers of the CFPB generally). 
48 See Slattery, supra note 10, at 264 (explaining that the CFPB’s broad 
jurisdictional grant “could allow the CFPB to uniformly regulate P2P lending 
platforms, regardless of their particular business models,” thus best positioning 
the CFPB to serve as a unified regulator for P2P platforms). 
49 See id. 
50 Id.  
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disclosure requirements.51 This narrower focus on investors poses 
problems with regard to the P2P lending industry and its involvement with 
both “investors” (i.e. those lending money through the platforms) and the 
mostly individual and small business consumers that turn to P2P lending 
platforms.52 
 Arguments in favor of a single regulator in the form of the CFPB 
have garnered much attention and support.53 However, rather than include 
the House proposal in the final version of Dodd-Frank, Congress opted to 
have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) study the issue 
further.54 The study took a comprehensive look at the structure of the 
industry, the current regulatory environment, the possibility of having the 
CFPB as a single regulator, and the effects of maintaining the status quo.55 
Still, the GAO’s conclusion left much to be desired. The GAO essentially 
found that either the current system or the CFPB as a single regulator 
system had merits and recommended a sort of wait-and-see approach.56 
Thus, P2P platforms find themselves in the same place today as they did 
in 2008—registering with the SEC (or finding an exemption) while 
struggling to comply with various state and other federal regulations.  
C. The U.K.’s Regulation of P2P Lenders: A point of comparison  
 The U.K.’s regulatory system for financial services looks very 
different from the U.S. system. For several years beginning in 2000, the 
U.K. had a single regulator for financial services under the auspices of the 
Financial Services Administration.57 After the financial crisis, the 
deficiencies and inefficiencies of the single regulator system became 
apparent.58 The U.K.’s response was to create three different, independent 
                                                     
51 SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified 
June 10, 2013) (noting “the mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation”).  
52 Cf. Slattery, supra note 10, at 274 (discussing the inflexibility of the SEC and 
its sole focus on investors).  
53 See, e.g., id; Verstein, supra note 20; Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1. But see 
Smith, supra note 25 (arguing against SEC regulation generally).  
54 See GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 2; Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-113, § 989F, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5301).  
55 See GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 42. 
56 See id. at 56–57. 
57 Philip Rawlings, All Change: The Fall of the FSA and the Further Rise of the 
Bank of England, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 16, 20 (2011) 
(discussing the restructuring financial services regulation in the U.K. after the 
2008 financial crisis). 
58 Id.  
306 THE FRONTIERS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING [Vol. 14 
 
regulators under the supervision of the Bank of England and with 
responsibilities to the Treasury as well.59  
 As of 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) retains 
responsibility for regulating P2P lending in the U.K.60 The FCA’s broad 
mandate and coverage of financial services activities and firms may give 
it the power and flexibility to adapt to a changing industry and promulgate 
regulations specifically tailored to the industry. FCA’s work in the P2P 
lending sector appears promising thus far.  
 The FCA’s regulations are broader than those in the U.S. While 
the SEC mandates disclosure and the CFPB maintains consumer 
protection measures, the FCA’s regulation includes mechanisms for 
disclosure, consumer protection, and, importantly, capital requirements 
for P2P lenders.61 The FCA’s focus on all the parties involved—investors, 
borrowers, and the integrity of the financial system—results in a much 
more comprehensive approach to regulation.62  
 As mentioned before, especially important is the prudential63 
approach to regulation that is part of the FCA’s model.64 P2P lenders are 
part of the disintermediation of financial services, but in some ways are 
                                                     
59 See generally Financial Services Act, 2012, cl. 21 (UK). The regulators 
responsible for the financial services sector in the U.K. include the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Financial Policy 
Committee. Id. The Prudential Regulation Authority is primarily responsible for 
the prudential regulation of the banking sector. Id. The Financial Policy 
Committee is the least powerful of the three and is primarily a macroprudential 
regulator with limited abilities to promulgate direct regulations. Id. The Financial 
Conduct Authority is tasked with regulating the intersection between consumers 
and the financial sector. Id. It regulates broker-dealer activities, financial fraud, 
insider trading, and consumer credit in addition to P2P lending. See id.  
60 Jonathan Moules, Government Boost for Peer-to-Peer Lending, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1d7a4a16-4061-11e2-
8e04-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3TdyCwwxR.  
61 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE FCA’S REGULATORY APPROACH TO 
CROWDFUNDING OVER THE INTERNET, AND THE PROMOTION OF NON-READILY 
REALISABLE SECURITIES BY OTHER MEDIA (2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ 
documents/policy-statements/ps14-04.pdf.  
62 See id.  
63 Here, prudential regulation or regulators most often refers to the types of 
regulations to which banks or banking entities are subject. These regulations 
typically focus on capital requirements, loan-to-value ratios, and other best 
practices rather than solely on disclosure.  
64 Cf. id. (discussing the minimum capital standards required by the FCA for 
online lending platforms).  
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providing many of the same services as banks.65 Thus, the FCA 
implementation of prudential regulations in addition to consumer 
protection and disclosure makes sense given the nature of P2P lending. Its 
efforts create a strong point of reference for the U.S. and others. Finally, 
the FCA also has a role in the U.K.’s macroprudential policy through its 
chief executive’s membership on the board of the Financial Policy 
Committee, the U.K.’s primary macroprudential regulator.66   
II. DIFFERENT MODELS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING  
  Different models of P2P lending have developed in response to 
changes in the market and the regulatory environment after 2008. Before 
examining these P2P lenders by taking a functional approach, it is 
important to take a look at the different models of P2P lending currently 
in existence along with some of the unique benefits and risks features of 
each model.  
A. The Loan-to-Note Model: Prosper, Lending Club, and Zopa   
 This model is the most common and probably the largest by 
volume of loans.67 As previously discussed, these platforms rely on a 
local FDIC-insured bank—WebBank in the case of both Lending Club 
and Prosper—to extend bank loans to consumers.68 The loan is purchased 
by the P2P platform, which then sells a note to the lender based on the 
lender’s selection of either a specific loan or a category of loans.69 The 
lender makes money through both an origination fee and a service fee 
taken out of the interest payments made on the loan.70  
                                                     
65 See Smith, supra note 25, at 21 (discussing how P2P lenders manager loans and 
provide information about borrowers to lenders); Verstein, supra note 20, at 254.   
66 Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Inst., Address at the Kennedy 
School of Government: Institutions for Macroprudential Regulation: The UK and 
the U.S. (Apr. 17, 2014), www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/04/ 17-
institutions-macroprudential-regulation-kohn.  
67 See Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 493–94.  
68 GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 11–13.  
69 Id.  
70 Verstein, supra note 20, at 454. 
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Figure 171 
 The payment on the note by the platform to the lender is 
contingent upon continued payment by the consumer borrower.72 While 
the lenders admit a duty to “use commercially reasonable” efforts to 
collect on delinquent loans, these efforts are attended by high fees.73 This 
feature is important, as it greatly reduces or eliminates most of the 
default risk for the P2P platform and places the risk on the lender.74 
 The default risk—how frequently consumers defaulted— is the 
primary risk posed by this model. Early on in the life of Prosper, its 
default rate on loans made through the platform was high.75 Lending 
Club’s default rate was lower, but it also restricted its loans to consumers 
with much higher credit scores.76 The danger occurs because the P2P 
platform has little incentive to pursue repayment when borrowers default. 
Their own liability to the lender is contingent upon the borrower’s 
repayment, and the size of the loans makes it economically inefficient for 
                                                     
71 GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 12 (illustrating the 
mechanics of P2P lending platforms such as Prosper and Lending Club).  
72 Slattery, supra note 10, at 248.  
73 Id. at 248–49. 
74 Id. What is even more concerning is that Lending Club “reserves the right to 
issue debt senior to lenders’ rights secured by payment on the loans lenders fund.” 
Id. at 251.  
75 See id. at 248 (discussing how default rates on loans made by Prosper were 
originally as high as 36%). 
76 Id. Prosper also adjusted its eligibility terms to raise the minimum credit score 
for borrowers eligible to take out a loan using the site. Since then, its default rate 
has decreased to be more in-line with Lending Club’s. See Verstein, supra note 
20, at 453.  
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the sites to track down every delinquent borrower.77 Certainly, as major 
players in the field, there is a reputational incentive to make sure that 
borrowers are creditworthy, so that the sites can continue to attract 
lenders. But it is probably only the high costs of SEC registration78 that 
prevent less scrupulous platforms from taking advantage of this 
mismatch of incentives.  
B. Pure Crowdfunding and Market Place Model  
 The high costs and enhanced scrutiny stemming from SEC 
registration has probably led some sites to take advantage of exemptions 
by catering to accredited investors.79 Currently, this model exists primarily 
for P2RE (Peer to Real Estate) loans,80 which involves crowdfunding 
short-term construction, rehabilitation, or other real-estate-focused 
projects.81 This model also seems appealing and suited for those who wish 
to target the small business market.82  
 The entrance of institutional investors such as hedge funds will 
probably pose the most interesting challenges for this type of lending.83 
The promise of a democratized system of truly peer-to-peer lending is 
threatened whenever the pool of potential lenders is restricted to those who 
qualify as accredited investors. But more importantly, the rise of 
secondary markets and securitization for these types of loans84 re-
introduces some of the same dangers, such a moral hazard or risk 
transmission, that financial disintermediation promises to address. 
C. Shadow Banking Model   
 Though not properly P2P lenders, online lending platforms that 
operate in the same market and use the same technologies as P2P platforms 
merit some consideration. OnDeck is probably the largest of these new 
                                                     
77 Slattery, supra note 10, at 248–50.  
78 Id. at 256. Prosper spent over $5 million on compliance costs in 2010. Id. at 
258.  
79 See, e.g., PATCH OF LAND, https://patchofland.com (last visited May 26, 2016); 
Butcher, supra note 8. 
80 Groundfloor is another example of real estate-focused P2P platform that until 
recently used intrastate offering exemptions in order to crowdfund projects. See 
Trinh, supra note 12. Recently, however, they decided to register their securities 
in order to scale their business and offer loans outside of Georgia. See id.  
81 Id.  
82 William Alden, Start-Up Lendoor Aims to Use Crowdfunding for Small-
Business Loans, DEAL BOOK (Oct. 29, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/ 
10/29/start-up-lendoor-aims-to-use-crowdfunding-for-small-business-loans/. 
83 See Alloway, supra note 6. 
84 Id.  
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online lending shadow banking firms.85 OnDeck operates more like a 
traditional banking or shadow banking entity by lending money backed by 
its own capital.86 Like the major true P2P lending platforms, OnDeck uses 
advanced, proprietary technology to weigh the risks posed by usually 
small business borrowers.87 OnDeck also sells many of these loans in 
secondary markets,88 which creates the potential for the lax underwriting 
standards by firms operating in this market.89 
D. Micro-Finance Model  
 Micro-finance websites like Kiva operate in much the same way 
as Lending Club or Prosper.90 These sites allow individuals who may be 
committed to a cause, such as funding women in the third world who are 
starting a business, to provide the capital necessary to fund small-scale 
economic development.91 The amounts of these loans are not necessarily 
smaller than those found on Lending Club or Prosper.92  
 The money is aggregated by the P2P and transferred to the 
platform’s “field partners” who vet and collect repayment from the 
borrower.93 The field partners are paid interest by the borrower, but the 
lender providing the money is not paid any interest.94  
 
                                                     
85 See Jeremy Quittner, How OnDeck's IPO Went Off Without a Hitch, INC. (Dec. 
18, 2014), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/ondeck-capital-ipo-and-the-jobs-
act.html. Shadow banking is a term used to describe intermediaries that participate 
in the creation and sale of credit, but are not regulated as traditional banks.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 However, nothing indicates that OnDeck’s lending or underwriting standards 
are lax or below par in any way. Rather, the model examined here comes with 
many of the same structural dangers one sees in mortgage brokers and other 
lenders that make money sourcing loans, but don’t necessarily keep “skin in the 
game.” The lax (or non-existent) underwriting standards of many mortgage 
brokers in the years leading up the financial crisis was, of course, dangerous 
enough to contribute to the worst recession since the Great Depression.  
90 See generally Kevin Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-To-Peer Financing for 
Development: Regulating The Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1209 
(2010).  
91 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for 
Commercially Sustainable Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1167–68 
(2011) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice]. 
92 Compare Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 309, 347 (2013), with Verstein, supra note 20, at 452.  
93 Davis & Gelpern, supra note 90, at 1222–23.  
94 Id. 
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Figure 295 
 Using the no-interest system on the lender-side avoids forcing 
these types of P2P entities from needing to register with the SEC.96 
Because they are charities, they might be subject to other forms of 
regulation in order to maintain their 501(c)(3) status.97 The danger in this 
model is not really to the lender, who is presumably providing capital out 
of generosity, but to the borrower who still pays high interest rates to the 
field partners.98 These interest rates can sometimes even exceed the rates 
charged by pay-day lenders in the U.S.99 
E. Regulating the Different Types of P2P Lenders   
 As discussed, different P2P lenders pose different risks and 
benefits to lenders and borrowers. An optimal regulatory solution to a 
highly diverse field should not focus too much on the specific structure of 
these transactions and platforms, since they are likely to change and 
evolve. Rather, regulations should focus on the general functions of P2P 
lending. It is yet unclear what government entity or regulator would be 
positioned best to lead the charge on regulating P2P platforms.100 
However, the following section will discuss an approach that any or all of 
                                                     
95 GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 15 (illustrating how Kiva 
works). 
96 Davis & Gelpern, supra note 90, at 1241.  
97 Id. at 1240–44.  
98 Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice, supra note 91, at 1168. 
99 Id. In his article, Schwarcz makes an interesting argument for switching to a 
securitization model to attempt to lower the costs for borrowers. Id.  
100 See, e.g., GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 56–57. 
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the regulators could take to address the P2P lending sector in all of its 
various manifestations.  
III. TAKING A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF 
PEER-TO-PEER LENDERS  
 In an article on regulating financial change, Prof. Steven Schwarcz 
suggests taking a “functional approach” to the regulation of financial 
services.101 He, like many others, has noted that too much of the regulation 
of financial services is backwards-looking.102 Instead, Schwarcz 
encourages regulators to look at the core functions of finance in order to 
understand the basic contours and operations of the system.103 In this way, 
regulators can avoid constantly trying to regulate the newest product, 
transaction, or threat, but can approach regulation in a way that addresses 
the risks at the very heart of the financial system.104  
 Given the potential blank regulatory slate for an industry like P2P 
lending,105 a functional approach provides a strong starting point for 
framing future discussions about regulation. Though Schwarcz focuses on 
the microprudential and macroprudential functions and risk separately in 
his article,106 it is worth examining these functions together. That way, the 
macroprudential risks of the P2P industry may be better understood.  
A. Functions of Peer-to-Peer Lending  
 The various functions discussed below are those noted and 
examined in Schwarcz’s article on regulating financial change.107 Again, 
they provide a useful framework for understanding P2P lending’s place in 
the financial system and can be used to focus conversations about the risks 
and benefits of different models of P2P lending.  
1. Disaggregation and Efficient Funding 
 Disaggregation is the spreading of financial participation and risk 
amongst those in the best position to put capital to its highest and best 
use.108 On the other hand, failures in information-access and rationality 
                                                     
101 See generally Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change, supra note 17.  
102 See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Euro Area Risk (Mis)management, in 
RECALIBRATING RISK: CRISES, PERCEPTIONS, AND REGULATORY CHANGE 
(Edward Balleisen et al., eds.) (forthcoming); see also Schwarcz, Regulating 
Financial Change, supra note 17.  
103 See Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change, supra note 17, at 5–6.  
104 Id.  
105 Cf. GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 56–57 (noting that 
regulators should continue to look at various regulatory solutions).  
106 See, e.g., Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change, supra note 17, at 8. 
107 See generally id.  
108 See id. at 12. 
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present two barriers to the efficient functioning of capital markets.109 P2P 
lending has the potential to overcome these barriers by increasing 
disaggregation.110  
 P2P lending platforms’ greatest strengths are in this area. Not only 
do they open up lending and borrowing to greater numbers of people, but 
they also use technology to address some of the information and rationality 
failures previously faced.111 The real value of Prosper and Lending Club 
along with the other P2P lenders’ is their ability to efficiently evaluate the 
credit worthiness of borrowers and disseminate that information amongst 
the largest possible pool of potential investors.112 
 Thus, any regulation in this space should focus on making sure the 
information gathered and disseminated by P2P lending platforms is 
accomplishing this goal.  
2. Risk Management and Behavior Monitoring 
 A weakness of P2P lending platforms is the incentive mismatch 
between lenders and the platforms. The platforms take an origination fee 
and then a relatively small fee for the continued servicing of the loan.113 
This compensation structure may incentivize the P2P platforms to 
originate loans with little regard for the borrowers’ potential to default 
given the borrower’s responsibility for repaying the notes is contingent 
upon the borrowers’ repayment of the loan.114 The small size of the loans 
also makes it inefficient for the platform and the lender to pursue 
delinquent borrowers either on their own or through a third-party debt 
collection agency.115 
 The SEC’s current registration requirement reduces the risk for 
lenders who use Prosper and Lending Club by theoretically requiring 
disclosure of these risks to lenders through the Section 5 registration and 
prospectus process.116 However, the SEC’s registration process is not 
ideally suited for retail investors seeking to lend extra capital through one 
of these platforms.117 Any future regulation should seek to optimize risk 
                                                     
109 See id. at 12–13.  
110 See Slattery, supra note 10, at 235.  
111 See id. at 238.  
112 See, e.g., id. at 238–39.  
113 See Verstein, supra note 20, at 454. 
114 Cf. Slattery, supra note 10, at 248 (noting Prosper’s early default rates).  
115 See supra text accompanying notes 74–76.  
116 Cf. Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 507; Smith, supra note 25, at 21 (noting 
registration requirements around the loans). 
117 The average prospectus can run over a hundred pages and include detailed 
financial statements, which makes it unlikely that the average investor will closely 
examine it. See, e.g., Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 507.  
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management by either adjusting the liability imposed on P2P platforms for 
defaults or utilizing some other mechanism to correct the mismatch of 
incentives.118  
3. Maturity Transformation 
  Maturity Transformation refers to “the asset-liability mismatch 
that results from the short-term funding of long-term projects.”119 This is  
less of a problem with P2P lenders than with traditional banks, since P2P 
lenders, in theory, rely on customers who are willing to invest in the full-
term of the loans advanced to borrowers120 unlike banks that rely on short-
term funding for long-term loans. However, this could be a problem for 
marketplace lenders that self-fund their loans and then, like banks, rely on 
the secondary markets or securitization to fund new loans. As consumers 
become more reliant on access to capital through these online lenders, the 
failure of a major lender could significantly disrupt the financial system.  
4. Interconnectedness and Concentration  
 Interconnectedness and concentration in the financial markets 
were among the primary contributors to the 2008 financial crisis.121 In his 
article, Schwarcz discusses the importance of limiting the effects of any 
shocks to the financial system by breaking the transmission of those 
shocks.122 Globally, macroprudential regulators and oversight committees 
have proposed various tools for dealing with the transmission of risk 
including ring-fencing, contingent capital, and counter-cyclical capital 
requirements for financial system participants.123 Unfortunately, many of 
                                                     
118 The risk of poor oversight and corporate controls at P2P lenders is best 
reflected in the corporate governance controversy that engulfed Lending Club and 
resulted in the resignation of its founder and CEO. Lending Club was found to 
have knowingly sold a large investor $22 million-dollars of loans that violated the 
investor’s express instructions. See Peter Rudegeair, Lending Club CEO Fired 
over Faulty Loans, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 9, 2016), http://www. 
wsj.com/articles/lendingclub-ceo-resigns-over-sales-review-1462795070. 
119 Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change, supra note 17, at 34. 
120 See, e.g., PETER MANBECK & SAMUEL HU, CHAPMAN & CUTLER, LLP, THE 
REGULATION OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING: A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 
1 (2014).  
121 INT’L MONETARY FUND, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, & FIN. STABILITY 
BD., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2009), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf. 
122 Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change, supra note 17, at 45–47.  
123 See, e.g., EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD., FLAGSHIP REPORT ON MACRO-
PRUDENTIAL POLICY IN THE BANKING SECTOR (2014), https://www.esrb. 
europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_flagship_report.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., 
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these tools seem poorly adapted to the P2P lending sector. Thus far, this 
has not been an issue due to the relatively small size of the P2P lending 
sector compared to other parts of the financial services sector.124  
 Recent trends in the P2P market show the potential for 
concentration within smaller market segments.125 The failure of one or two 
P2P lending platforms in a niche market has the potential to destroy access 
to credit within those niche markets and cause a credit crisis—at least 
within that market—if reliance on those lenders is great enough. The 
FCA’s imposition of capital requirements on P2P lenders may mitigate 
these risks.126 
 The other issue that may arise as the industry matures is the 
interconnectedness that arises from a secondary market for P2P loans. The 
first securitization of P2P loans has already taken place.127 With 
securitization, many of the benefits of disaggregation native to the P2P 
lending model could be lost if platforms and the initial lenders rely on large 
financial institutions to provide a robust secondary market for these loans.  
 Any future regulation of P2P lenders should consider the 
interconnectedness of the industry and the potential for risk to transmit 
through the system causing mini-credit crises.  
CONCLUSION 
 The advantages of P2P lending are clear, but the regulatory 
responses to this new industry are inadequate thus far. The U.S.’s 
fragmentary model of regulation offers the least hope for a comprehensive 
and well-thought out response to the risks posed by P2P lending. The 
fragmented model also presents the greatest chance for burdensome and 
uncoordinated regulation to stifle future innovation in the industry.128 The 
U.K. offers a promising example for the U.S. to follow, because a single 
                                                     
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS: PROGRESS REPORT TO 
G20 (2011), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111027b.pdf.  
124 Peer-to-peer platforms facilitated roughly $700 million in loans during 2013, 
while standard consumer loans accounted for about $60 billion that same year. 
See Yuliya Demyanyk & Daniel Kolliner, Peer-to-Peer Lending Is Poised to 
Grow, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www. 
clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-trends/2014-
economic-trends/et-20140814-peer-to-peer-lending-is-poised-to-grow.aspx.  
125 See, e.g., de la Merced, supra note 9. 
126 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE FCA’S REGULATORY APPROACH TO 
CROWDFUNDING OVER THE INTERNET, AND THE PROMOTION OF NON-READILY 
REALISABLE SECURITIES BY OTHER MEDIA 6 (2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/ 
static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-04.pdf. 
127 Tracy Alloway, supra note 6. 
128 See generally Verstein, supra note 20.  
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regulator taking a functional approach to regulation would certainly be the 
ideal.  
 Rethinking the balance between the benefits provided by P2P 
lending and the risks posed by the industry can help regulators arrive at an 
optimal regulatory structure. Part of rethinking the regulation of P2P 
lending might begin by looking at other situations where access to credit 
trumps greater regulation in importance. For instance, bank loans and 
notes are not subject to SEC regulations even though banks are serving the 
same function as the lenders on P2P platforms.129 The bankruptcy code 
also allows companies to issue securities without complying with SEC 
regulations presumably because solvency and debtor rehabilitation are 
valued higher than investor protection in this situation.130 
 The relative youth of the P2P lending industry131 should inspire 
governments and regulators to take a proactive approach to designing 
comprehensive and thoughtful solutions that spur innovation and protect 
investors, borrowers, and the financial systems that rely on the efficient 
allocation of capital through these platforms.  
                                                     
129 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank 
of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d. 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that 
“notes delivered in consumer financing” are not securities under the “family 
resemblance” test).    
130 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
131 Zopa, the oldest P2P lending site, was founded in 2005. See also Slattery, supra 
note 10, at 234.  
